APPENDIX F:
ACTION PLAN FOR THE JUSTICE COURTS, STATE OF NEW YORK UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION (OCA), NOV 2006. EXCERPTS ON FACILITY IMPROVEMENTS: BEST PRACTICES FOR JUSTICE COURT SECURITY
ACTION PLAN for the JUSTICE COURTS
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ACTION PLAN F O R T H E JUSTICE COURTS
APPENDIX B
BEST PRACTICES FOR JUSTICE COURT SECURITY
Longstanding OCA experience managing court facilities, and nationwide experience with the security threats that courts inherently face, point to a series of steps that all court administrators should take to ensure the safety and security of their courts and all persons working in or appearing before them. The jurisdiction of the Justice Courts, and particularly their preliminary and limited trial jurisdiction over crimes, makes it essential that every locality sponsoring a Justice Court take seriously its duty to ensure the security of their courts. Threats can emerge in seconds, and as a growing spate of courthouse violence nationwide graphically has illustrated, these threats can be tragic.
Many of these threats are, however, preventable with commonsense steps that are within the means of nearly every locality to adopt. Recognizing that no two Justice Courts are alike and that the diversity of Justice Court facilities and dockets makes a one-size-fits-all approach impractical, OCA offers these guidelines to inform judges, court staff and local government leaders in securing their courts:
1. Dedicate space exclusively for Justice Court use. Full implementation of many court security best practices is best achieved when there exists sufficient space dedicated exclusively for the use of judges, court staff, attorneys, litigants and other members of the public with business before the court. By its nature, multi-use Justice Court facilities often must accommodate needs inconsistent with the proper security profile of a court. For that reason, the safest Justice Court is one that shares core operational space with no other governmental or non-governmental function. Municipalities with relatively large dockets and physical infrastructure for the local government already have established dedicated Justice Court facilities; other localities are strongly advised to do so. If localities must hold Justice Court proceedings in multi-use facilities, the court facility and all other appurtenant space open to the public (e.g. bathrooms, corridors, closets) should be swept for weapons and other potential threats before Justice Court proceedings begin, and all of that adjacent space should be considered part of the Justice Court for purposes of these Best Practices.
2. Eliminate potential courtroom weapons. Whether in a dedicated courtroom setting or a mixed-use facility, even the most seemingly innocuous object can become a weapon in seconds: a window or glass-covered table can be broken and large shards converted into knives, while a wall-mounted fire extinguisher easily can become a projectile. Experience in judiciaries nationwide proves, sometimes only in tragic hindsight, that these kinds of potential weapons must be eliminated from places where court proceedings are held. To this end, glass should be eliminated from tabletops and old windows should be either replaced with shatterproof glass or lined with inexpensive material to limit breakage. Likewise, moveable objects such as fire extinguishers should, to the maximum extent that Fire Codes permit, be mounted away from where litigants congregate. In courtrooms with microphones, portable microphones with long wires are disfa-
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vored because the wires also can become weapons: these microphones should be replaced with fixed-location microphones wherever possible.
3. Create strategic barriers. The main security benefits of having a court bench are to physically elevate the judge and separate the judge from others in the courtroom, making physical contact between the judge and would-be assailants more difficult. Justice Courts should, if possible, install benches high and wide enough to confer this minimal security benefit. If benches are impracticable, then several large tables should be placed between the judge and the rest of the courtroom to create a makeshift physical barrier. Likewise, the main security benefit of having a “bar” between the audience and the working section of the courtroom is to establish a physical barrier that, even if a would-be assailant scales it, can afford precious seconds for intended victims to take evasive action. Each Justice Court should install such a bar wherever possible. Similarly, there should be a bar or other physical barrier between the judge and wherever a witness would sit to provide a zone of protection in case a witness becomes violent. If a courtroom space cannot accommodate immovable physical barriers of this nature, as much space as possible should be created between the audience seats and the working part of the courtroom. Localities using spaces too small to provide such space should identify alternative space for holding court.
4. Eliminate strategic lines of sight. Disturbing as the prospect may be, justices and court personnel could be — and have been — watched and targeted from outside courtrooms. Many Justice Court facilities have windows or other clear lines of sight between unsecured outside locations and the court bench (or table) where the judge presides, the judge’s office, the clerk’s office, etc. All of these lines of sight should be obscured. Measures as simple as tinting windows (opaque coverings can be affixed to existing windows), relocating desks (to obscure direct lines of sight to windows) and erecting inexpensive portable screens can greatly assist at minimal cost.
5. Secure courtroom furniture. An intoxicated or distraught litigant or other interested party to a contentious court action can become explosively violent in seconds, and experience reveals that such persons often can be quite strong. If a weapon is unavailable, even a table or chair can suffice to threaten or injure others. Especially in Justice Court facilities with dedicated courtrooms, all courtroom furniture (e.g. tables and chairs) should, if feasible, be bolted to the floor; in mixed-use facilities, furniture can be bolted down and then released to clear the space for other uses. In both dedicated and mixed-use Justice Court facilities, lightweight furniture (e.g. card tables that some Justice Courts provide for litigants) should be avoided in favor of heavier and more immovable wood furniture; plastic chairs and other furniture should be avoided unless physically linked together and thus made more difficult to throw.
6. Provide uniformed and armed security presence. Courts nationwide employ uniformed and often armed security personnel for two reasons: their presence can have an important deterrent effect on would-be perpetrators of courtroom violence, and their expertise can become vitally necessary if a security threat requires immediate response. These truths are as valid in Justice Courts as in State-paid courts, and yet few Justice Courts have uniformed security personnel in courtrooms to protect the court and the public. Recognizing that Justice Courts lack statutory authority to appoint officers eligible to carry firearms, localities should ensure that whenever the court
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is in session, and especially when the court is hearing criminal or other sensitive cases, at least one member (and in the busiest courts, at least two members) of the local police or sheriff’s department are on-site to protect the court and the public. As with regular-hour Justice Court sessions, off-hour proceedings (e.g. arraignments and emergency applications) likewise require dedicated armed presence to protect the court. Where such a police officer or deputy sheriff is armed in the courtroom, he or she generally should remain at sufficient distance from members of the public to minimize the possibility that they could lunge for the officer’s pistol, and the pistol should be secured in a proper Level 3 holster (i.e. a holster with three restraints) to ensure maximum control of the weapon.
7. Provide ingress screening. One of the most important preventive security measures a locality can take for its Justice Court is to provide ingress screening for all persons seeking to enter a court facility. The most effective method is by proper magnetometer, installation of which requires sufficient space to accommodate the machine and its operators, separate secured space from unsecured spaces and eliminate direct lines of sight between the court and unsecured areas. Larger town and village halls can accommodate these adaptations with minimal changes to the space; one-room all-purpose facilities may require modest capital alterations. In either case, it should be a priority of every locality operating a Justice Court to provide some ingress screening to keep weapons out of court.
8. Secure and illuminate parking. Perhaps the most palpable threat to court security occurs after a court session, away from public view and often at night. Judges or court staff members leaving court for their cars naturally expose themselves to risk. For that reason, some localities provide escort for the judge and court staff after the conclusion of court proceedings. This practice is a good one and should be emulated throughout the Justice Court system. Localities also should, where possible, provide a secure (i.e. gated and/or patrolled) and well-illuminated place for judges and court staff to park, as well as secure access between that parking location and the court facility. Typically, this latter adjustment will require a second backdoor, key-controlled entrance to the court facility, which also would convey the secondary benefit of giving judges and court staff an alternative way to leave a court facility (and police to enter a court facility) under threat conditions.
9. Arrange armed escort for bank deposits. Especially for high-volume Justice Courts, the collection of revenue can concentrate in the court significant funds, including cash, that must be deposited in a local bank. The clerk or other personnel responsible for making these deposits thereby can be exposed to the risk of assault, particularly if that person’s bank deposits are relatively routine (e.g. each Monday and Thursday afternoon after lunch). To protect the staff and the Justice Court’s funds, the locality should ensure that physical deposits of Justice Court funds in the local bank be protected by armed escort, typically by the local police.
10. Secure storage of cash and negotiable instruments. Until funds are deposited in a local financial institution, Justice Court staff must keep physical custody of cash and checks paid in satisfaction of court mandates. While some Justice Courts properly store these funds in secure, immovable vaults with the double protection of key or combination access, others keep cash merely in a desk drawer or cabinet — either in a small lockbox that can be easily removed or even
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in a simple envelope. At absolute minimum, Justice Courts should keep funds, and especially cash, in safes too large to move, segregated from public areas, with access limited to the minimum possible number of persons and secured by proper combination lock. Deposits and withdrawals should be conducted under as secure circumstances as possible, preferably under armed escort as described above.
11. Provide duress alarms in strategic places. When threats do arise, seconds count. Even in the presence of armed security, but especially when a court lacks such security, it is imperative that judges and staff have a fast and secret way to call for help. To that end, judiciaries nationwide are installing duress alarms at strategic locations (e.g. in judges’ chambers, near benches, in backroom offices) that can be activated by push of a button. These inexpensive alarms are easily installed to provide direct 911-like notification to local police that an emergency is in progress, and thereby can make the difference between life and death or escape and apprehension. Just as New York’s State-paid courts are installing these duress alarms, so too should localities make this critical investment in the security of their courts.
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